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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
TRADE REGULATIONS
THE LIABILITY OF PRIVATE ACCREDITING ASSOCIATIONS
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COMMON LAW
Plaintiff in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,' is a two-year, propri-
etary college for women located in the District of Columbia.' De-
fendant Middle States is a nonprofit corporation which conducts a
program of evaluation and accreditation of educational institutions
primarily in the Middle Atlantic area including the District of Colum-
bia.3
 On several occasions Marjorie Webster submitted applications to
1 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal docketed, No. 23351, D.C. Cir., Aug. 5,
1969. A stay of the district court's injunction was granted by the court of appeals on
Sept. 26, 1969.
2 Marjorie Webster was founded in 1920 in the District of Columbia by Miss
Marjorie Webster and her mother. Although originally a partnership, in 1927 Marjorie
Webster became incorporated. The school is presently a closely-held corporation with
all of the stock owned by the Webster family. Id. at 472.
Marjorie Webster offers courses of instruction in seven departments: Liberal Arts,
Physical Education, Kindergarten Education, Communications, Secretarial, Art, and
Retail Merchandising. Students are enrolled in either terminal or transfer programs. Mar-
jorie Webster will give transfer recommendations only to those students who have
enrolled in the transfer program. The school awards an Associate in Arts (AA) degree
to students who successfully complete the required curricula. All other graduates are
given certificates. Id.
3 Middle States was organized under the Education Laws of the State of New
York on May 27, 1966 as a nonprofit, non-stock corporation. It is the successor to the
Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, an unincorporated as-
sociation founded in 1887 by a group of nonprofit liberal arts institutions. According
to its charter, the purpose of the association is
to encourage the achievement of higher quality and to facilitate the develop-
ment of better working relations among the higher institutions, secondary schools,
and other educational agencies in the Middle States.
Id. at 473.
In addition to these general purposes, Middle States serves as an accrediting body.
Applicants for accreditation must undergo an intensive institutional evaluation. A major
part of this evaluation is conducted by the applying institution, with the assistance of
a visiting team of educators drawn from Middle States' member schools. The purpose
of the evaluation is to ascertain the goals of the institution and to assess the ability of
the existing program to accomplish these goals. Once the evaluation is completed, the
visiting team submits a report of its findings and recommends to the Commission on
Institutions of Higher Education, a Middle States agency, that accreditation be granted
or denied. The final decision, however, rests with the Higher Education Commission. If
accreditation is granted, the applicant automatically becomes a member of Middle States.
Id. at 474.
The membership of Middle States includes 346 nonprofit, liberal arts institutions of
higher education located in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Middle
States is one of six regional accrediting associations which accredit nonprofit, liberal
arts institutions. On March 2, 1964, the six associations established the Federation of
Regional Accrediting Commissions of Higher Education to represent the regional
associations in matters of common interest. Id. at 473, 475.
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Middle States seeking evaluation and accreditation.' On each of these
occasions Middle States refused to consider Marjorie Webster for
evaluation solely on the basis that Marjorie Webster was a profit-
making institution and, as such, could not qualify for accreditation by
Middle States. 5
 Following the rejection of its application in 1966,
Marjorie Webster instituted legal proceedings against Middle States,
seeking a permanent injunction enjoining Middle States from enforcing
its exclusionary rule.
Marjorie Webster sought to sustain the action on three inter-
related theories. First, it alleged that Middle States and its member
institutions had formed a combination or conspiracy in restraint of
Marjorie Webster's trade in the District of Columbia in violation of
Section 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.° Second, Marjorie Webster
contended that Middle States' refusal to consider its application for
accreditation was arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable, and
consequently violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the United States Constitution.' Third, Marjorie Webster asserted
that Middle States' exclusionary policy violated the common law con-
4 In
 1928, Marjorie Webster corresponded with Middle States regarding accredita-
tion. On that occasion Middle States noted that Marjorie Webster's lack of a liberal
arts program precluded it from membership in Middle States. Subsequent rejections
relied upon the fact that Marjorie Webster was a profit-making institution. Defendant's
Brief on Motion for Summary Judgment at 7.
5 Since 1928 Middle States has required that to be eligible for accreditation a school
must be "nonprofit with a governing board representing the public interest." 302 F.
Supp. at 475. The Middle States Higher Commission has accordingly never evaluated
or accredited a proprietary institution. Middle States reassessed its position in 1957 and
appointed a special committee to study this problem. After the committee recommended
that the nonprofit criterion be retained, Middle States reaffirmed its exclusionary rule.
In 1964 the Federation issued a policy statement concerning accreditation criteria which
also included the non-profit requirement. Id.
6
 Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce in . . . the District of Columbia .. . is
declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in
any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
The action was brought pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act which reads as follows:
• Any ... corporation . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws „ . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts
of equity.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
Jurisdiction was based on § 12 of the Clayton Act:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a cor-
poration may be brought in any district wherein it may be found or transacts
business.
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). The court relied 'upon Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation
of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and found that Middle States' contacts with
the District of Columbia were sufficient in nature and degree to permit suit under § 12
of the Clayton Act. 302 F. Supp. at 464.
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trolling the activities of private associations. The District Court
for the District of Columbia found for Marjorie Webster on all
counts, and awarded "[a]n injunction prohibiting [Middle States]
from excluding [Marjorie Webster] from accreditation because of its
proprietary character and ordering [Middle States] to accredit [Mar-
jorie Webster] if it shall otherwise qualify." 8
This comment will examine the legal foundation of the result
reached in Webster and then explore the legal and social ramifications
of the decision. Particular emphasis will be given to the propriety and
legality of placing higher education, including the accrediting activities
of private associations, within the ambit of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The legal justification for the court's conclusion that Middle
States is a quasi-governmental body and thus subject to the restraints
imposed by the due process clause of the Constitution will also be
discussed. Finally, the legal basis for the common law cause of action,
in which the court attemps to regulate the internal affairs of a private
association, will be considered.
I. THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "[e] very con-
tract, combination, . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade or
commerce in . . . the District of Columbia . . . ." 8 In general this sec-
tion embraces contracts, combinations, and conspiracies which operate
to the prejudice of the public interest by unduly restricting competi-
tion or unduly obstructing the course of trade." Any activity which
has or may have that effect comes within the purview of section 3.
The variety of activities which are proscribed are quite numerous;
they may arise in all types of businesses or business transactions. Thus,
in order for a plaintiff to successfully establish that a defendant has
violated section 3, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the
defendant has conspired or combined with others, (2) that the plain-
tiff is engaged in "trade or commerce," and (3) that the defendant's
restraint of plaintiff's trade is unreasonable.
In light of the necessity for a plaintiff to allege and prove the
above elements in a section 3 case, Marjorie Webster argued that
it was engaged in "trade or commerce" within the meaning of section 3,
and that Middle States and its member institutions combined to re-
7 Jurisdiction and venue for this count were based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(1964), which reads as follows:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
The court also concluded that it had jurisdiction over Middle States on this count. 302
F. Supp. at 459. See also D. C. Code Ann. § 11-521(a) (1) (1967).
8 302 F. Supp. at 478.
9 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
10 See generally W. Thornton, A Treatise on Combinations in Restraint of Trade
234b-37 (1928); 1 H. Toulmin, Jr., A Treatise on the Anti-trust Laws of the United
States 93-112 (1949).
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strain Marjorie Webster's trade in the District of Columbia. Further-
more, the school asserted that Middle States' exclusionary rule was
unreasonable, for it resulted in the prevention or inhibition of com-
petition 'from profit-oriented institutions of higher learning such as
Marjorie Webster. In support of this last allegation Marjorie Webster
noted the difficulties encountered by non-accredited institutions in
recruiting high school graduates and placing transfer students in four-
year colleges. Contending that it possessed all the qualifications neces-
sary for accreditation by Middle States except the nonprofit require-
ment, Marjorie Webster concluded that the nonprofit requirement of
Middle States was unreasonable per se," and constituted a violation of
the Sherman Act.
Middle States denied that it had conspired specifically to restrain
Marjorie Webster's trade. It further maintained that neither it nor
Marjorie Webster was engaged in "trade" within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. Middle States also claimed that its regulation excluding
profit-oriented institutions was not unreasonable. While admitting that
accreditation was important to institutions of higher education, Middle
States denied that it was essential to the successful operation of such
institutions. Middle States also argued that a profit-making institution
such as Marjorie Webster is unable to make a total commitment of
its financial resources to the educational process. This it concluded
adversely affects the quality of the educational program provided by
such a school.
After considering the arguments of both parties, the Webster
court concluded, in spite of the absence of any evidence showing a
conspiracy by Middle States to injure Marjorie Webster, that Middle
States and its members did combine to restrain Marjorie Webster's
trade." Although appreciating the lack of precedent in applying the
antitrust laws to the field of higher education, the court nevertheless
held that Marjorie Webster was engaged in "trade" within the meaning
of section 3." Finally, the court disregarded the "per se" test and
applied the "rule of reason,"" finding "that the exclusionary criterion
11 The "per se" test applies to practices which are found to be totally lacking in
redeeming value, and are likely to have a detrimental effect on competition. 302 F. Supp.
at 467. For example, price fixing and group boycotts are practices commonly considered
per se violations of the antitrust laws. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958). For an interesting comment on the role of the "per se" test in the antitrust
laws, see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139 (1952).
42 302 F. Supp. at 466.
13 302 F. Supp. at 459. Before reaching that decision the court indicated that
Marjorie Webster's status as a "trade", not Middle States', was the issue for determina-
tion. It stated that it is a well-recognized principle of law "that when the organization
at which the restraint is directed is in trade, it is immaterial whether the offending
association is so engaged." Id. at 466.
14 Id. at 467. The "rule of reason" is applied when the combination or conspiracy
is "not so devoid of potential benefit or so inherently harmful as to fall into the [per se]
category . • ." When a court makes the above determination, it must then examine the
history and nature of the restraint to ascertain its reasonableness. See Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For an excellent article on the "rule
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does inhibit Webster's ability to compete in the field of higher educa-
tion and does not further the stated objectives of the associations. Such
a discriminatory exclusion without evidence to justify it must be found
arbitrary and unreasonable.""
A. Higher Education and "Trade"
The Webster court's holding that a private institution of higher
learning such as Marjorie Webster is engaged in "trade" is a novel
result and constitutes a misapplication of the Sherman Act. Although
the exact holding of the case concerns itself with a profit-making in-
stitution, the court sweepingly includes the activities of nonprofit as
well as profit-making schools within the scope of the Act."
In order to assess the conclusion reached by the court, it is in-
structive to examine the legislative history of the Act. 17 The Sherman
Act was enacted in 1890 during the era of the great industrial mo-
nopolies." The Act was intended to eliminate a number of evils which
these monopolies had generated, such as price fixing, the limiting of
production, and the lowering of quality in the monopolized articles."
Congress felt . that such monopolies, bent on destroying market com-
petition, were inimicable to the public good.2° In order to curb these
abuses of the free enterprise system, Congress worded the Act broadly
rather than enumerating the various types of proscribed activities.'
With reference to such general wording, Senator Edmunds stated:
[A]fter most careful and earnest consideration by the Judi-
ciary Committee of the Senate it was agreed by every
member that it was quite impracticable to include by specific
description all the acts which should come within the mean-
ing and purpose of the words "trade" and "commerce" .. .
by precise and all-inclusive definitions; and that these were
truly matters for judicial consideration.22
Although the Sherman Act is worded broadly, it is doubtful that
Congress intended the Act to apply to the activities of educational
associations. Congressional debate is silent with respect to the status
of higher education under the Act. This is perhaps understandable
since higher education represented the antithesis of the problem which
concerned Congress. The legislative history indicates clearly that the
of reason," see Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition or Workable
Monopoly?, 63 Yale L.J. 348 (1954).
115 302 F. Supp. at 469.
18 "A new and pivotal question here for determination is the applicability of the
antitrust laws to the field of education." Id. at 465. Although the language suggests that
the court has included all higher education within the Sherman Act, it might be argued
that this language is merely dictum.
17 See generally 1 H. Toulmin, Jr., supra note 10, at 1-23.
18 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940).
19 See id. at 493; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
20 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
21 See id. at 489.
22 Id. at n. 10.
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Act was intended to break up the large corporate trusts that were in-
juring the public. 23 The Act was passed in "response to popular de-
mand aroused by the fear of gigantic industrial and commercial
enterprises which threatened to seize control of the manufacturing and
marketing of consumer goods of all kinds.' 24 Conversely, educational
institutions have traditionally been non-profit, public-service organ-
izations directed at aiding the intellectual development of those seek-
ing their services.
Congress did not create a new cause of action when it enacted the
Sherman Act, but merely codified and applied "old and well-recognized
principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our
State and Federal Government."' Thus, where the legislative history
is silent, congressional intent can be ascertained only by examining
these common law principles.
American common law of unfair competition traditionally in-
volved commercial activities." The law attempted to prevent restraints
23 See id. at 492-93.
24 C. Gregory, Labor and the Law 202 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
25 1 H. Toulmin, Jr., supra note 10, at 7.
26 See, e.g., Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875) ; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio
434 (N.Y. 1848) ; Hooker & Woodward v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. 1848) ; Cen-
tral Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880).
American common Iaw of unfair competition follows closely English common law.
W. Thornton, supra note 10, at 81. The evils of monopolies first became widely known
in England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603) when the Crown granted
"patents of monopoly" as rewards for faithful service. Id. at 34. This expedient was used
in lieu of direct payments from the royal coffers, which were not sufficient to adequately
compensate the numerous individuals who distinguished themselves during Elizabeth's
long reign. Id. At one time or another, monopolies were awarded for the production
of salt, iron, currants, oil, and many other commercial items. Id. The monopolists, free
of competition, could raise prices at will, and often charged exorbitant amounts. Id.
at 35.
The legality of these monopolies was finally tested in 1602 in Darcy v. AIlin, 74
Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602). The case involved a patent for the manufacture of playing
cards. The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement. The defendant asserted,
however, that the patent was illegal. In finding for the defendant, the court noted that
monopolies served only the private gain of the patentees and invariably resulted in an in-
crease in prices, a reduction in quality of goods, and the impoverishment of those who
were once involved in the trade. Id. at 1139. In 1623, Parliament passed a statute which
embodied the principles of the Darcy decision. W. Thornton, supra note 10, at 38.
At English common law a contract in restraint of trade was distinct from a patent
of monopoly. The former was an agreement in which one party bound himself not to
engage in a particular occupation or trade. Id. at 46. Even though such a contract had
the effect of lessening competition, it was not considered criminal. 1 H. Toulmin, Jr.,
supra, note 10, at 52. However, because it was credited with having the dual effect of
depriving the public of the contracting laborer's skills, and depriving the laborer of his
livelihood, the contract was considered void and unenforceable. Id. at 47-50.
In the United States, a contract in restraint of trade took on additional importance;
it was the means to the monopolization of an industry. In most states there was deci-
sional law which treated these contracts as unenforceable. See, e.g., Brown v. Jacob's
Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902) ; American Livestock Comm'n v.
Chicago Livestock Exch., 143 Ill. 210, 32 N.E. 274 (1892) ; Cummings v. Union Blue-
stone Co., 164 N.Y. 401, 58 N.E. 525 (1900). The common law in the United States was
aimed at preventing public harm caused by monopolies in the consumer goods industries.
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or monopolies which were entered into for the purpose of pecuniary
gain.27 In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, Justice Stone described the
types of contracts which were proscribed at common law:
They were contracts for the restriction or suppression of
competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide
marketing territories, apportion customers, restrict produc-
tion and the like practices, which tend to raise prices or
otherwise take from buyers or consumers the advantages
which accrue to them from free competition in the market's
On the other hand, none of the common law antitrust cases ap-
plied the common law doctrine to non-commercial activities. 29 Further-
more, there are no English or American cases where the doctrine has
been applied to higher education." Since common law antitrust prin-
ciples were never applied to higher education, it is unlikely that Con-
gress intended the Sherman Act to so apply. The Supreme Court, in
dictum, has itself recognized that the activities of educational insti-
tutions are not subject to the Sherman Act."
In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,' the Su-
preme Court considered the scope of "trade or commerce" as used
in Section 3 of the Sherman Act. The United States brought an action
to enjoin a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce in the cleaning and dyeing industry in the District of Columbia.
The defendants were engaged in the wholesale business of cleaning,
dyeing, and renovating clothing at plants located in the District of
Columbia. The Government alleged that in August, 1928, the defen-
dants met and agreed to fix prices and to assign to one another specific
retailers as exclusive customers. The defendants admitted this fact
but argued that they were nevertheless immune from the Act. They
asserted that they were engaged solely in the rendering of a service
to products that had already been transferred to the ultimate con-
sumers. The defendants contended that such an activity was not "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
The district court struck this defense on motion by the Govern-
ment and entered the decree sought. On direct appeal to the Supreme
Court." the only issue for determination was the scope of section 3.
The Court held that it was broad enough to encompass the activities of
the defendants and affirmed the decree of the district court." In reach-
ing its decision the Supreme Court noted that Congress intended the
27 See, e.g., Craft v. McConoughy, 79 III. 346 (1875) ; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio
434 (N.Y. 1848).
28 310 U.S. at 497.
29 Brief for Appellant at 46, Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, — F.2d — (D.C. Cir. 1970).
30 Brief, for Appellant at 47.
31 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
82 Id.
33 Direct appeal is authorized by 15 U.S.C. 4 29 (1964).
34 286 U.S. at 437.
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word "trade" as used in the Act to be given a broad interpretation."
The Court concluded that a definition which properly described the
breadth of the word "trade" was that offered by Justice Story in The
Schooner Nymph," when he interpreted the Coasting and Fishery Act
of 1793." Justice Story stated: "Whenever any occupation, employ-
ment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a live-
lihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is con-
stantly called a trade."" (Emphasis added.) The Court adopted this
definition and held that the activities of the defendants were within its
scope."
Significantly, this definition specifically excludes the liberal arts
and the learned professions. The basis for this exclusion may lie in
the fact that neither the liberal arts nor the learned professions possess
the type of competitive or commercial characteristics that are common
to other occupations. In any event, the fact remains that the Supreme
Court did adopt this definition when interpreting the meaning of the
word "trade" in the Sherman Act.
The Webster court refused to accept The Schooner Nymph defini-
tion of "trade" as adopted by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Clean-
ers.' Instead, the Webster court relied on the interpretation of the
word "trade"' offered by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in United States v. American Medical Ass'n: 42 [T]he word 'trade'
when embraced in the phrase 'restraint of trade' [includes] all oc-
cupations in which men are engaged for a livelihood."' (Emphasis
added.) However, the vitality of this definition is questionable in light
of the subsequent disposition of this case by the Supreme Court. 44
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically reject this all-inclu-
sive definition, it refused to adopt it.
The AMA case involved an action in which the United States
charged the American Medical Association (AMA)45
 with forming a
conspiracy in restraint of the trade of Group Health Association, Inc.,
a nonprofit cooperative which provided medical services for its mem-
bers and their dependents. The indictment also charged that the de-
35 Id. at 435 (liy implication).
36 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834). It appears that Justice Story
used Samuel Johnson's definition of trade: "Occupation; particular employment,
whether manual or mercantile, distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions."
S. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785).
37 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 32, 1 Stat. 316.
38 18 F. Cas. at 507.
30 286 U.S. at 436-37.
40 302 F. Supp. at 465.
41 Id.
42 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), rev'g 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939).
Id. at 710.
44 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), aff'g 130 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
45 Other defendants in the case were the Medical Society of the District of
Columbia, Harris County Medical Society, Washington Academy of Surgery, and
several individuals.
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fendants, in violation of section 3, restrained the trade of doctors
employed by Group Health, and hospitals utilized by Group Health
members.
According to the government, the AMA attempted to prevent
Group Health from attracting doctors to its staff or retaining those
already on it by threatening doctors with expulsion from the AMA
if they worked for Group Health. The AMA also threatened disciplin-
ary action against doctors who afford consultation privileges to Group
Health physicians and against hospitals which admitted Group Health
doctors to their courtesy staffs.
The district court sustained a demurrer by the AMA on the
grounds that the practice of medicine was not "trade" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act," and that the indictment was vague
and uncertain and did not clearly charge the commission of a crime."
The district court based its holding upon the fact that The Schooner
Nymph definition of the word "trade" excluded medicine and that this
definition was adopted by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Cleaners."
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that all
occupations in which men were engaged for a livelihood, including the
practice of medicine, were "trade" for the purpose of the Sherman
Act." In reaching this conclusion the court reiterated the well-estab-
lished principle that proper interpretation of the Act is achieved only
by analyzing its legislative history. Such analysis established that
Congress adopted the common law meaning of "trade." Citing En-
glish" and American" common law cases which considered restraints
on the practice of medicine "restraints of trade," the court of appeals
concluded that the practice of medicine was "trade" for purposes of
the Sherman Act.
With regard to the AMA's contention that the Supreme Court had
excluded the learned professions, including the practice of medicine,
from the scope of the Sherman Act by virtue of its adoption of The
Schooner Nymph definition in Atlantic Cleaners, the court of appeals
stated that the only question before the Court in Atlantic Cleaners
was whether the word "trade" was broad enough to include the clean-
ing and dyeing industry." The court of appeals then concluded:
To reinforce its reasoning, the Court quoted language which
happened to exclude the learned professions, but this limita-
tion was not responsive to the question at hand [whether
cleaning and dyeing was trade] and was purely casual, and
in the circumstances ought not, we think, to be regarded as
46 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D.D.C, 1939).
47 Id. at 757.
48 Id. at 755.
49 110 F.2d at 71C.
60 See, e.g., Horne • v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (CP. 1831).
81 See, e.g., Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175 (1879) ; Haldeman v. Simonton, 55
Iowa 144, 7 N.W. 493 (1880).
52 110 F.2d at 709.
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a proper guide in deciding the important question in this
[AMA] case."
After deciding in favor of the government on the other contested
issues, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court
for trial on the merits, where a jury subsequently convicted the AMA
of violating Section 3 of the Sherman Act.
The AMA appealed to the court of appeals" and argued that the
Supreme Court, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader," had repudiated the
reasoning of the first AMA court of appeals decision which held that
the practice of medicine was "trade" within the meaning of the Sher-
man Act." In Apex Hosiery the Supreme Court held that the end
sought by the Sherman Act was the "prevention of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions . . . .''' The AMA
argued that the practice of medicine was not a commercial transaction,
and hence was not intended by Congress to be covered by the Sherman
Act.58
 Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals reaffirmed its
earlier opinion, holding that the practice of medicine was "trade" for
purposes of the Act.59
 The court asserted that even exempting medi-
cine from the Sherman Act would not exculpate the defendants be-
cause they bad restrained the activities of Group Health, an associa-
tion that provided a business service."
On further appeal the Supreme Court affirmed," but refused to
decide whether the practice of medicine was "trade" within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act. 52
 Instead, the Court based its decision solely
on the fact that the AMA had restrained the activities of Group
Health: 63
Group Health is a membership corporation engaged in
business or trade. Its corporate activity is the consummation
of the cooperative effort of its members to obtain for them-
selves and their families medical service and hospitalization
on a risk-sharing prepayment basis. The corporation collects
its funds from members. With these funds physicians are em-
ployed and hospitalization procured on behalf of members
and their dependents. The fact that it is cooperative, and pro-
cures service and facilities on behalf of its members only, does
not remove its activities from the sphere of business."
53 Id.
54 American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
65 310 T.J.S. 469 (1940).
56 130 F.2d at 235.
67 310 U.S. at 493.
58 130 F.2d at 235, 237.
5° Id. at 235-37.
6° Id. at 238.
61 317 U.S. 519 (1943). •
62 Id. at 528.
68 Id.
64 Id.
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The refusal of the Supreme Court to consider whether the prac-
tice of medicine was "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act
is an implicit rejection of the all inclusive definition offered in the
first AMA court of appeals decision and relied upon by the Webster
court.
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to adopt the court of appeal's
definition of the word "trade," but it also refused to comment on The
Schooner Nymph definition adopted in Atlantic Cleaners. The status
of The Schooner Nymph definition remained in doubt until the Supreme
Court decided United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds."
ten years later.
At issue in the Real Estate Boards case was whether the sale of
personal services was "trade" within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Act. The defendants claimed an exemption under Section 6 of the
Clayton Act," which states that the labor of humans is not an article
of commerce. The Court rejected this contention and cited, in addition
to The Schooner Nymph definition, the definition67
 offered by the court
of appeals in the first AMA case which purported to include all occu-
pations in the term "trade."68
 However, with respect to the AMA
definition, the Supreme Court stipulated that it was not "intimating
an opinion on the correctness of the application of the term to the pro-
fession s .""
Since the first application of The Schooner Nymph definition to
Section 3 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has had two oppor-
tunities to reject or modify it. In the AMA case the Court refused to
act in spite of several common Iaw cases associating medicine with
antitrust actions. In the Real Estate Boards case the Court again re-
fused to overrule The Schooner Nymph definition. Thus it appears that
the Supreme Court still recognizes the validity of the definition in its
entirety. Since this definition excludes higher education as well as the
learned professions, it is submitted that the Webster decision has
failed to recognize an important legal precedent. Instead the Webster
court has relied upon a definition appearing in a court of appeals de-
cision which has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court.
The Webster court maintained, however, that higher education, as
a result of its phenomenal growth and expansion in the United States,
has taken on many of the attributes of business and should conse-
quently be considered a "trade."" To deny this, the court said, would
be "to ignore the obvious and challenge reality." 71 The implication to
be drawn from this is that even if education was once an activity
exempted from the Sherman Act, it has lost that privilege, and must
now be treated as any other large business or commercial enterprise.
66 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
66 15 U.S.C.	 17 (1964).
67 339 U.S. at 490-91.
68 Id. at 491.
69 Id. at 492.
7° 302 F. Supp. at 465-66.
71 id. at 466.
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The assumption underlying this argument—that the commercialization
of an activity automatically brings such an activity within the ambit
of the Act—is invalid. The exigencies of our society have required
colleges and universities to adjust their operations accordingly. Phys-
ical growth and the adoption of certain business techniques are
unavoidable by-products of this effort. Although higher education has
become commercialized in some respects, this, in itself, is insufficient
to bring the activities of educational institutions within the definition
of "trade." As previously mentioned, the purpose of higher education
is to serve the community. As such, higher education can be distin-
guished from the business and commercial enterprises that have tra-
ditionally been considered "trade."
The Webster court, in holding that Marjorie Webster was engaged
in "trade," placed emphasis upon the fact that the school was profit-
oriented: "Middle States can hardly deny that plaintiff is engaged
in trade since the plaintiff's proprietary character is the reason for
the membership exclusion and the sine qua non of this proceeding."72
Apparently the court is suggesting that even if higher education is
generally not subject to the Sherman Act, this exemption would not
apply to Marjorie Webster, a profit-making institution. Undeniably,
the Sherman Act was intended to control abuses generated by the
profit system. But the Act was directed at certain activities or occu-
pations, profit or nonprofit, which were exploiting the consumer. The
Supreme Court has itself recognized that the lack of profit motive
will not, in itself, exclude an activity from the Sherman Act." Cor-
relatively, the existence of a profit motive should not automatically
make the activity a "trade" within the meaning of section 3. 74 More-
over, The Schooner Nymph definition, which has been adopted by the
Supreme Court, specifically excepts the liberal arts from the definition
of "trade," regardless of whether the institution is engaged in making
a profit. Therefore, the question of Marjorie Webster's status under
the Sherman Act can not be answered by simply emphasizing that it,
unlike other institutions, is engaged in making a profit.
B. Reasonableness o f Restraint
Having established that Marjorie Webster was engaged in "trade,"
the Webster court then examined the nature of the alleged restraint.
It utilized the guidelines offered by Justice Brandeis" in the majority
opinion in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States:"
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be de-
termined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competi-
tion. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
74 See Brief for Appellant at 39-40, Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, — F.2d — (D.C. Cir. 1970).
75 302 F. Supp. at 467.
76 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even de-
stroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil be-
lieved to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. 77
 (Emphasis added.)
Application of the Brandeis guidelines led the Webster court to
conclude not only that the exclusionary rule inhibited Marjorie Web-
ster's ability to compete, but also that the rule did not further the
objectives of Middle States." Both of these findings are incorrect, and
it is submitted that the application of the entire Brandeis test supports
the proposition that the restraint imposed was reasonable.
The Webster court found that Middle States had acquired mo-
nopoly power over regional accreditation, and, in denying it to Marjorie
Webster, had deprived the institution of a "significant business serv-
ice.^7° Citing Associated Press v. United States" and Silver v. New
York Stock Exch.81 as authority, the Webster court held that the
denial of accreditation was actionable under the antitrust laws as an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 82 The facts in Associated Press and
Silver are, however, clearly distinguishable from the facts in Webster.
In Associated Press the Government had charged in the nonprofit
membership association with promulgating bylaws which constituted
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. According to the
Associated Press (AP) bylaws, an applicant could not be admitted
to membership if he competed with an AP member, unless the mem-
ber consented. Also, AP members were forbidden to disseminate AP
news to non-member newspapers. The District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered summary judgment for the government,
and issued an injunction prohibiting enforcement of these bylaws."
On direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed," stating: "It is apparent
that the exclusive right to publish news in a given field, furnished by
the AP and all of its members, gives many newspapers a competitive
advantage over their rivals."'"
77 Id. at 238.
78 302 F. Supp. at 469.
79 Id. at 468-69.
80 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
81 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
82 302 F. Supp. at 467, 469.
83 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
84 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
85
 Id. at 17.
297
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The service provided by AP is significantly different from the
accreditation granted by Middle States. Accreditation is more an
honorarium than a business service. It identifies the accredited school
as an institution which subscribes to and has achieved the standards
and goals promulgated by the other members of the voluntary accred-
iting association. Unlike membership in the AP, accreditation cannot
be purchased, it must be earned. Although accreditation helps a
school's competitive position and increases its stature, its primary
function is to set standards and to recognize institutions that have
achieved these standards. The AP, on the other hand, is a true busi-
ness service which is only incidentally concerned with the improvement
of newspaper quality.
In Silver the service denied was access to information regarding
stock market transactions. Silver, a Texas stockbroker, was not a
member of the New York Stock Exchange (the Exchange), but had ar-
ranged for direct telephone communications with several Exchange
members for the purpose of obtaining current information on market
activities. The Exchange ordered the lines disconnected without grant-
ing Silver a hearing, which resulted in a severe loss to Silver's business.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York entered
summary judgment for Silver," but the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari," and held
that denial of this service, at least without granting Silver a hearing,
was a violation of the antitrust laws. 89 This service, as in Associated
Press, was so vital to the occupation in which the plaintiff was engaged
that denial of the service put him at a severe competitive disadvantage.
Indeed, Silver's inability to utilize this service had resulted in one of
his companies going out of business. Marjorie Webster, on the other
hand, has prospered in spite of the fact that it has not received ac-
creditation. There is no indication that Marjorie Webster has suffered
any noticeable financial injury. Its profits have increased during the
years 1961-1969 by over 200 percent.' It receives over 90 percent
of its revenue from student tuitions,' and still rejects over 200
students per year." Admittedly, Marjorie Webster is not held in the
same esteem as accredited schools. This lack of esteem, however, has
not affected its competitive position, and it is ludicrous to conclude
that it has been denied a "significant business service."
In addition to finding that Marjorie Webster had been denied
a "significant business service," the court concluded that Middle
States' exclusionary rule did not further the objectives of the associa-
tion." Rather than testing the nexus between Middle States' objectives
86 Silver v. New York Stock Exch. 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
87 Silver v. New York Stock Exch. 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962).
88 371 U.S. 808 (1962).
89 373 U.S. at 365.
99 Brief for Appellant, at 32.
91 Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact at 65.
9 2
 Id. at 66.
93 302 F. Supp. at 469.
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and its exclusionary rule, the court substituted its judgment for what
Middle States' objectives should be:
Educational excellence is determined not by the method of
financing but by the quality of the program. Middle States'
position . . . ignores the alternative possibility that the profit
motive might result in a more efficient use of resources, pro-
ducing a better product at a lower price."
The Webster court has unjustifiably thrust upon Middle States
an objective—the encouragement of economic efficiency—which it does
not have. The purpose of Middle States is to foster the improvement
of higher education. The rules of the association were established by
professional educators who felt that "proprietary ownership limits the
full development of an institution of higher education.' 95 This philos-
ophy is not mere conjecture but is based upon the sad experience of
profit-making schools" and the conditions which normally accompany
the existence of a profit motive."
Admittedly, there is nothing inherently evil in making a profit.
However, profit considerations are detrimental to those factors which
are vital to an effective and progressive educational institution. Of these
factors, two of the most important are the quality of the administration
and the role of the faculty.
Middle States considers the directing force wielded by the presi-
dent of a college or university an essential element in achieving and
maintaining educational excellence." Individuals of the caliber and
stature required for such a position cannot function in an owner-em-
ployee relationship. "They must define the institution in their own
persons, the proprietary configuration will not allow them to do so.""
Similarly, the faculty has its special role in an educational institu-
tion, and proprietary control would undermine this role. The faculty
has the burden of establishing and operating the educational program.
They have the responsibility for making many difficult academic de-
cisions and must be allowed to do so without fear of retaliation. Middle
States correctly justifies its position that a proprietary school is ill-
suited to attracting or retaining a qualified faculty:
A college is a vastly more complex establishment than a busi-
ness is, with involutions of responsibility and a dispersion of
power which nearly defies analysis. The reason is that the
kind of people who do the best work in higher education, the
kind who give it its vision, drive, and authority, flourish best
in this atmosphere; indeed the best of them will accept no
other, and have no need to.
94
 Id. at 468.
95 Memorandum from the President of Middle States to the Principals, Head-
masters, and Presidents of Member Institutions, August 1, 1969, at 4.
96 Daniel 'Webster; Meet Marjorie Webster, 55 A.B.A.J. 1186, 1187 (1969).
97 Brief for Appellant, at 9.
98 Memorandum, supra note 95, at 3.
99 Id.
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A labyrinth of academic organization, professional re-
sponsibilities, individual involvement, academic freedom, ten-
ure, and all manner of consequent understandings has grown
up to protect it. To implant all this mechanism in the em-
ployed body of a business corporation, and to attain thereby
under the terms of private ownership the relationships which
infuse and sustain a faculty, is unthinkable.'"
Still another factor which influenced Middle States in promulgat-
ing its exclusionary rule is the adverse affect which the profit motive
might have on the unity of purpose necessary in an educational insti-
tution."' This unity of purpose, a total commitment to the educational
task, is one of the most important criteria for evaluating a school. The
existence of a profit motive destroys this unity of purpose and jeop-
ardizes the ultimate goal of higher education—the attainment of
academic excellence.
The real danger in proprietary institutions is that profit con-
siderations might take precedence over educational considerations. In
many situations the best educational decision may be financially
unwise. Whether an institution should add to its faculty in order to
accommodate a larger student body, or increase the size of its library
to better serve its existing enrollment, are just two situations where a
conflict in objectives might lead to a wrong decision. Also, certain
activities, such as scientific research, might be relegated to a position
of low priority solely because of their small return on investment.
Another problem inherent in proprietary institutions is their
susceptibility to rapid change. The death of the owner or the sale
of the controlling interest could affect the quality of the institution.
"[T]he thought that the owner of a proprietary institution could
change its nature overnight is utterly repugnant to the academic com-
munity."'" The present procedure of Middle States is to review ac-
credited schools every ten years.'" It was able to,adopt this procedure
only because the goals of nonprofit institutions are relatively stable.
If proprietary schools were accredited, Middle States would be re-
quired to re-evaluate these schools each time a significant portion of
their ownerships was transfered. Such a change in procedure would
probably be administratively and financially impracticable.
Finally, the need for controversy and tension within educational
institutions militates against the accreditation of proprietary schools.
The hallmark of a great university is its encouragement of diverse and
new ideas. "[T]he continuous dissension within a common commit-
ment, is what keeps . . . the institution in a healthy turmoil."'" It is
doubtful whether this "healthy turmoil" would be fostered, or even
permitted, in a proprietary institution.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 4.
103 Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact at 30.
104 Memorandum, supra note 95, at 4.
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Thus it appears that Middle States has justification for fearing
that when educational decision-making has been put in the hands of
individuals who are concerned with making a profit, it is probable
that quality will suffer, or at least fail to enjoy the undisputed primacy
possible only in a nonprofit institution. The nonprofit criterion, al-
though not assuring educational excellence, reduces the hazards which
were considered above.
II. TEE CONSTITUTION
As mentioned earlier Marjorie Webster also alleged that Middle
States violated the due process clause of the Constitution by excluding
the institution from consideration solely because of its profit-making
character."' Marjorie Webster asserted that Middle States was a
private association performing a state function and was thus subject
to constitutional restraints. Alternatively it argued that Middle States
exercised delegated powers of governmental nature. This, it concluded,
would also limit the activities Marjorie Webster could constitutionally
perform. Middle States, on the other hand, denied that it was engaged
either in the performance of a state function or that it was exercising
delegated powers. Thus it concluded that its internal policies were
not subject to judicial scrutiny. The court, however, agreed with
Marjorie Webster, and held that Middle States was engaged in a quasi-
governmental activity and was therefore subject to constitutional con-
straints."' It further found that the evidence adduced with respect
to the Sherman Act was applicable to the constitutional argument, and
that this evidence clearly demonstrated that Middle States' exclusion-
ary rule was arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable and was thus
unconstitutional."'
In support of its holding the Webster court noted the role ac-
creditation plays in the granting of federal funds to students attending
educational institutions."' Federal funds will often not be released
unless the program followed by the student has been accredited by a
nationally recognized or regional accrediting association."' The court
noted that the United States Office of Education has an agreement with
Middle States whereby an applicant for regional accreditation may
qualify for federal funding assistance pending the processing of its
application.'" The Webster court did not consider, however, that pro-
vision had been made in the cited legislation for institutions without
108 See p. 286 supra.
1013 302 F. Supp. at 470.
107 Id. at 471.
108 Id. at 470.
10D See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1653 (1964). This section pertains to assistance given by the
Veterans Administration to Korean War veterans attending either nonprofit or pro-
prietary schools.
110 302 F. Supp. at 470.
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regional accreditation to qualify for the federal program by means of
direct application to government accrediting agencies."'"
The authorities relied upon by the Webster court do not support
its holding that Middle States is a quasi-governmental agency. For
instance, in Evans v. Newton112
 the contested activity was the opera-
tion of a park. The park had been willed to the city of Macon,
Georgia, with the stipulation that its use was to be restricted to
Caucasians. When the city desegregated the park, a suit was brought
in a state court in which the court was asked to appoint private
trustees who would continue the segregationist policy. The Georgia
court appointed the trustees. After the Georgia Supreme Court af-
firmed,'" the United States Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
park returned to public ownership. The Court noted that, in spite of
the transfer, the park was still maintained with municipal funds, and
that over the years it had acquired an aura of public ownership that
could not be removed simply by returning it to private trustees." 4 In
its opinion the Supreme Court was careful to note that the mere provi-
sion of services by a private enterprise similar to those offered by the
government was not sufficient to impose constitutional constraints."'
Government control or assistance must be present before the activity
can be considered subject to such constraints. Middle States, however,
has never been subject to governmental control regarding its accre-
diting activities. Hence, to hold that it is subject to constitutional con-
straints merely because it is engaged in a service that is also rendered
by some governmental agencies is an unwarranted extension of the
principle of the Evans case.
Marsh v. Alabama"° and Terry v. Adams," 7 the other cases
cited by the Webster court, may also be distinguished. Generally they
hold that some activities, such as the conduct of elections or the opera-
tions of a municipality, are so fundamentally governmental in nature
as to automatically subject them to constitutional constraints. To
consider accreditation to be this type of basic governmental function is
unjustified. In the United States accreditation has historically been a
non-governmental undertaking.
By accepting the regional accreditation offered by Middle States
as an adequate indication of institutional quality, the Government has
not delegated any of its obligations or services. It has allowed appli-
cants for federal assistance to substitute this evaluation in lieu of
one by a governmental agency for purposes of determining eligibility
for federal programs. The Government is merely using Middle States
as a facility; it has not delegated any powers to Middle States.
111 38 U.S.C. g 1654 (1964). This section outlines the procedure for securing
accreditation from agencies which each state is authorized to establish.
112 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
113 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
114 382 U.S. at 301.
115 Id. at 300.
1" 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
11? 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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III. COMMON LAW
Marjorie Webster also contended that Middle States' refusal to
consider its application for accreditation constituted a violation of the
common Iaw pertaining to the operation and conduct of the internal
affairs of private associations. The college argued that Middle States
had acquired monopoly power over accreditation, and that accredita-
tion was an economic necessity. It was further contended that Middle
States was unreasonably denying accreditation and, hence, was subject
to judicial regulation. Middle States countered by denying that it
possessed such power or that it was using what powers it did have
unreasonably. Middle States also disputed the allegation that Marjorie
Webster was being injured by lack of regional accreditation. The
Webster court applied the same evidence adduced with respect to the
antitrust aspects of the case, and found that without regional accredita-
tion the ability of Marjorie Webster to continue to operate successfully
was doubtful. 118 Relying on Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical
Soc'y,119 the Webster court held that judicial intervention was justified
and granted the relief sought by Marjorie Webster.'
In Falcone the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a decision of
the trial court which ordered the medical society to admit to member-
ship a duly licensed physician.121 Doctor Falcone had been excluded by
the defendant-society solely because he was not a graduate of a four-
year, AMA-approved medical school. As a result of the exclusion,
Dr. Falcone was unable to use the facilities of local hospitals, and ,
was, in effect, prevented from practicing his profession. In holding that
judicial intervention was warranted, the Falcone court noted two
factors. First, the effect of the exclusion was to limit the privilege
granted by the state-issued license." 2 Second, the exclusion resulted in
severe financial loss to the plaintiff. 123 Middle States' refusal to ac-
credit profit-oriented institutions also stems from a professional con-
cern for standards. However, it does not limit any state-granted rights
or privileges. As previously mentioned, Marjorie Webster has not
suffered severe financial injury. Thus, the two critical facts present in
Falcone are absent in Webster.
Another common law case involving a private membership asso-
ciation, but not cited by the Webster court, is Grillo v. Board of
Realtors. 124 The association in Grillo was a trade association which
offered its members the benefits of a multiple listing real estate service.
Grillo, an unsuccessful applicant for membership, was denied access
to this service. Although Grillo did not establish severe financial loss
as a result of this denial, the court found that the action of the as-
118 302 F. Supp. at 428.
119 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
120 302 F. Supp. at 469. •
121 34 N.J. at 598, 170 A,2d at 800.
122 Id. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
128 Id. at 587, 170 A.2d at 794.
124 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. 1966).
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sociation was illegal.'" In reaching this decision the court employed
a "business advantage" test similar to that developed in cases adjudi-
cated under the antitrust laws.'" Grillo was awarded monetary dam-
ages and the association was compelled to make the service available
to all licensed real estate brokers.
Comparing Falcone with Grillo, it appears that the courts employ
different standards when scrutinizing the membership criteria of profes-
sional associations as opposed to trade associations. Professional groups
can validly impose restrictions on their membership to improve pro-
fessional standards so long as they do not significantly limit state-
granted privileges or severely affect the financial situation of the in-
dividuals excluded. Trade associations, on the other hand, cannot
utilize standards which deprive an individual or business of a "business
advantage." Hence, a less stringent test is applied in the case of trade
associations. The Webster court, however, failed to differentiate be-
tween judicial intervention in the activities of private professional
associations as distinguished from private trade associations. Instead
of requiring the severe financial injury which the Falcone case de-
manded for judicial relief, the court implicitly utilized the "business
advantage" test—a test which is not applicable to professional as-
sociations.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the accrediting activities of private, professional
associations have been accorded special deference by the courts. 127
The basis for this deference lies in the very nature of the accrediting
process; it is a service-oriented function that requires an expertise
the judiciary lacks. In Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n of Col-
leges & Secondary Schools, 128
 the court noted this expertise:
In this field, the courts are traditionally . . . hesitant to inter-
vene. The public benefits of accreditation, dispensing infor-
mation and exposing misrepresentation, would not be
enhanced by judicial intrusion. Evaluation by the peers of
the college, enabled by experience to make comparative
judgments, will best serve the paramount interest in the high-
est practicable standards in higher education.'"
Through this form of self-government, accredited colleges and uni-
versities in the United States have maintained high standards of
quality.
125 Id. at 225, 219 A.2d at 648.
126 Id. at 222, 219 A.2d at 646.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Bar Ass'n, 197 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1952); North
Dakota v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir.
1938); Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 271 F.
Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Salter v. New York State Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100,
198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
128 271 F. Supp. 65 (ND. Ill. 1967).
129 Id. at 74.
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Admittedly, accrediting associations are not, and should not be,
immune from judicial review. Any review of standards, however,
should be confined to instances where the association has either applied
its policies in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or advocated
policies that are manifestly inconsistent with its announced goals. The
Webster court has, however, struck down the nonprofit standard of
Middle States without proof of either situation.
Should it be upheld, the Webster decision might severely injure
the effectiveness of accrediting associations. Subjecting accrediting
associations to law suits may discourage the maintenance of standards
conducive to the improvement of higher education. Rather than risk
involvement in costly litigation, the association may be induced to
grant accreditation to all applicants approaching the standards nor-
mally required. This progressive, lowering of quality could eventually
destroy the accrediting activities of private associations as effective
instruments of self-regulation.
ROBERT A. O'NEIL
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